Aristotle On Self-Awareness And His Influence

Abstract:

This paper concerns the history of representationalism and in particular a change in how mental representations came to be viewed: from something that enables us to perceive and thereby reveals the world to us, to something that cloaks or occludes it, enclosing us “within the circle of our own ideas.” So conceived, representations do not merely distort reality, they hide it from us completely. To speak of a veil of perception, then, is already to level a criticism. It is to suggest that the source of sceptical worries is representationalism itself, and that our only means of escape is to abjure representations entirely and understand perception in terms of a radically different model (typically some form of idealism or naïve realism).

    In this paper, I will not be concerned so much with alleged consequences of the veil, such as scepticism, or the assumptions or arguments that are thought to lead to it, like the argument from illusion. I will be focused instead on the thesis itself, which I take to have roughly the following form:

All we have direct awareness of [perceive, apprehend, know] are our representations [impressions, experiences, appearances, sense-data, ideas], and not the objects in the external world they seem to be from, of, or about.

It is often thought that this assumption and the notion of subjectivity it embodies are early modern inventions. But the thesis can already be found in antiquity, and the interesting question is precisely when and why it arose. After an initial exploration of the metaphor of veils, which exercises such a powerful grip on us, I turn to the underlying idea, tracing it backwards in time. We find a clear version in Plotinus and another in Sextus Empiricus, as criticisms of earlier philosophers — if Sextus is right, it is endorsed by the Cyrenaics in particular, but both Sextus and Plotinus seem to have the Stoics and Aristotle in mind as well. These are all misreadings, however: these earlier forms of representationalism are not guilty of the charge. So the question remains why later thinkers came to think so almost reflexively.

Main texts:

• Plotinus Enn. IV.6
• Sextus Empiricus M. 7.357–358 (cf. 353–354); PH 2.75 (cf. 72)
• Cyrenaics: Sext. Emp. M. 7.191–192, 194; Plut. Adv. Colot. 1120C–D; Anon. In Tht. 65.29–39; Cic. Luc. 76
• Stoics: LS 39A, B
• Aristotle: Mem. 1

Contact:

• University of Michigan
• vcaston[at]umich.edu

Abstract:

According to the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis, all animals have an awareness of their own constitution. This self-awareness manifests itself in a process of natural attachment or affinity, a self-appropriation during which we come to identify with our own nature and develop a coherent sense of self. At its core, oikeiōsis also involves the cultivation of a deep connection between the individual and the world around them and encourages a sense of responsibility and care towards all living beings. Although it is a notion that has been much discussed in recent scholarship, less attention has been paid to the temporal aspect of the operations of oikeiōsis that becomes more emphatic – at least in our surviving evidence – in Seneca’s Ep. 121. In this paper I will argue that by exploiting the temporal modalities of self-awareness in the context of his explanation of the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis, Seneca creates a strong notion of the 'Self'.

Main texts:

• Seneca, Ep. 12, Ep. 121
• Hierocles

Contact:

• Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of Philosophy

Abstract:

As we read Alexander’s remarks on the topics of Aristotle’s De anima III.2 in his own De anima and in Quaestiones III.7 and III.9, we may observe that his real interest goes beyond perceiving sensible objects and the activity of perception, towards a further kind of awareness: the awareness of the fact that it is us who are perceiving. This interest has strong roots in Aristotle (e.g. EN IX.9), who in his turn inspired the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis. Hence, it is no surprise that Peripatetics before Alexander already claimed the concept of oikeiōsis for Aristotelianism (cf. Mantissa c. 17). But Stoics like Hierocles scolded the Peripatetics for overlooking the fact that self-perception is prior to perception of external sensibles, and that self-perception is the principle of oikeiōsis. Does Alexander manage to preserve both Aristotle’s psychology and a Peripatetic version of oikeiōsis?

Main texts:

• Alexander De Anima 65.2–10 
• Alexander Quaestiones III.7, III.9
• Alexander Mantissa c. 17

Contact:

• Leiden University
• F.A.J.de.Haas[at]phil.leidenuniv.nl

Abstract:

On discussing the source of perceptual awareness (in Parm. IV, 957.18–958.11 Cousin) Proclus claims that there is a power in the rational soul of which the task is to attend to all activities of cognition and desire. On this account, perceptual awareness is one of the activities of the common attentive power. In the commentary on the Timaeus, however, we find a different approach which says (II 83.16–84.5 Diehl) that the highest level of sense-perception is endowed with συναίσθησις. The commentator does not clarify the meaning of the term but so much might be clear that we face an alternative: it either means self-awareness or joint-perception without reflexivity. The aim of the paper is to show that Proclus insists the unitary character of self-awareness throughout implying that there is no separate capacity for perceptual awareness alone. An inquiry into the notion of παρακολούθησις might corroborate the assumption that in Proclus’ view there is a single source of awareness.

Main texts:

• Proclus in Parm. IV, 957.18–958.11 Cousin
• Proclus in Tim. II 83.16–84.5 Diehl

Contact:

• Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Department of Philosophy, Budapest
• lautner.peter[at]btk.ppke.hu  

Abstract:

In his comments on Aristotle’s De Anima III.2, Pseudo-Simplicius (the identity of whom I shall not discuss, assuming, however, that the author is not Simplicius) returns time and again to his (the author is probably male) view according to which perception is projection of forms from the soul to a passive activity that takes place in the sense-organs. Such projection is, according to him, stimulated by external objects that are thereby perceived (e.g., 189.35-38; 190.3-5). This means that perception is defined as rational and conceptual as well as propositional; consider, e.g., the examples ‘that a thing seen is white’ (204.36-205.1) or ´that the thing seen is a man’ (210.20-21). In her recent study Freedom and Responsibility in Neoplatonist Thought (2020), Ursula Coope argues that authors around Damascius (to whom she also counts Pseudo-Simplicius), introduced a special type of rational self-awareness that is, as she says ‘strictly reflexive’ (chapter 12) and allows human beings to be responsive to reasons and to improve morally – yet running the risk that they worsen themselves instead. Coope also (briefly) distinguishes such self-awareness from the kind of perceptual self-awareness that is at stake in the commentary on III.2. However, given that human perception already is rational and immaterial for Pseudo-Simplicius (e.g., 187.35-36) and allows the crucial reflexive turn to itself (epistrephon, e.g., 187.32), this leaves the perceptual self-awareness squeezed between perceptual cognition in animals that ‘inclines as a whole towards the body’ (187.37-38) and fully rational ‘strict’ reflexivity. My initial hypothesis is, therefore, somewhat negative: In Pseudo-Simplicius’ general account of perception (as rational) and self-awareness as one of the hallmarks of rational immaterial cognitive capacities, there is a risk of making perceptual self-awareness superfluous. I hope, however, that in the talk I can show this initial hypothesis to be incorrect.

Main texts:

• Pseudo-Simplicius in De Anima 187.15–190.32

Contact:

• University of Stockholm
• miira.tuominen[at]philosophy.su.se

Abstract:

Philoponus, commenting on Aristotle’s famous discussion of how we perceive that we see and hear (De Anima III.2, 425b12-25), commits to the view that we are aware of all of our activities (both cognitive and vital) in virtue of a single attentive power (prosektikē dunamis) of the rational soul. Since, as Philoponus himself admits, this view is markedly different not only from the position of Aristotle and Alexander but also from that of Plutarch of Athens, it is worthwhile to investigate Philoponus’ reasons for adopting it.

     It is important to note that Philoponus, unlike Aristotle in the original passage, is not primarily concerned with the phenomenon of perceptual self-awareness but with the unity of self-awareness, that is, being aware of our different kinds of activities as belonging to us as unitary subjects.

     I argue that Philoponus’ interest in the unity of self-awareness betrays an even more fundamental concern about the unity of the self, raised by certain distinctive characteristics of Neoplatonic anthropology and metaphysics. Since for Neoplatonists a human being is composed of metaphysically heterogeneous elements, it becomes problematic whether and how these components form or belong to a unitary self. Philoponus takes the unity of self-awareness to be indicative of the unity of self so that his account of the former in terms of the attentive faculty hints towards an answer to this latter, more fundamental worry as well. I suggest that Philoponus, following a line present already in Plotinus, identifies the self proper with the rational soul which uses the body and lower psychic functions as instruments. The unity of the self in the broad sense, encompassing both the rational soul and the lower capacities, is provided by the attentive power which unites these components in a unitary experience of self-awareness.

Main texts:

Philoponus in De Anima III (Hayduck)

• 464.30–465.17
• 466.19–467.13

Plotinus Enneades

• I.1.7.1–9, 14–24
• I.1.10.1–10

Contact:

• Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of Philosophy
•  

Abstract:

In De Anima III.2 and elsewhere, Aristotle assumes that we can perceive several different items at a time. He focuses on two basic kinds of cases: (i) sensible items that belong to the same sense, such as colours to sight, and (ii) sensible items that belong to different senses, e.g., colour to sight and flavour to taste. However, it is not entirely clear how Aristotle accounts for simultaneous perception in the two cases. Does he give the same account for both? Or does he give a different account? Either way, a crucial question is this: what, according to Aristotle, is the capacity (in each case) by which we perceive more than one sensible item at a time? A more fundamental question is how he understands a sense (and a capacity) in the first place.

    I shall address these questions based on Aristotle’s considerations in De Anima III.2, 426b8–427a15. In this passage, Aristotle applies a distinction between being indivisible in number and place and being divisible in being. He also presents an argument from analogy: as the geometrical point is indivisible in number but divisible in being, so is the sense (or the perceptual capacity in its entirety). I argue that Aristotle is reconsidering here what constitutes a sense: what makes it indivisible (or one) and what makes it divisible (i.e., sense activities). Aristotle’s concern is that if we give too narrow an account of a sense (denying, e.g., that a sense can simultaneously be affected by contrary items), we cannot explain simultaneous perception. I also argue that unless Aristotle allows an individual sense to perceive several of its proper objects at a time (colours in the case of sight), he cannot give an adequate account of how anything can do that. It would not be of any help to appeal to a more comprehensive capacity, such as the common sense or the primary perceptual capacity, if no single sense can supply by itself the sensible items required for simultaneous perception, i.e., if the several items are not simultaneously present to the more comprehensive capacity.

    (It is worth noting that Aristotle addresses similar issues in De Sensu 7 and more briefly in De Anima 3.7 and De Somno 2. In this paper, I shall not discuss these chapters because they merit a treatment of their own.)

Main texts:

• Aristotle De Anima III.2, 426b8–427a15

Contact:

• University of Helsinki
• mika.perala[at]helsinki.fi

Abstract:

Despite the fragmentary state of our evidence, we know that early Stoics innovated, debated, and refined their understanding of aisthēsis. Often, however, scholars engage with the surviving evidence as part of more general reconstruction projects highlighting Stoic epistemology’s internal cohesion and explanatory power. Although there are good reasons for attempting these reconstructions, the downside is that they risk presenting Stoicism as artificially homogeneous, glossing over internal debates or downplaying innovations. In this paper, I shall approach the evidence with the explicit purpose of distinguishing, as much as possible, the differences between Stoic accounts of aisthēsis, the reconstruction of the motivations, objections and rival interpretations, as well as emphasizing the innovations by later Stoics. For this purpose, I will first briefly describe the common ground and assumptions all Stoics share. Then I will reconstruct Zeno’s account of aisthēsis and discuss the rival interpretations and contributions of Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Finally, I will examine distinctions reported in Stoic summaries and innovations introduced by Diogenes of Babylon, a certain Simias the Stoic and Hierocles.

Main texts: 

• Cicero, Ac. I 40–41
• Diogenes Laertius 7.49–52
• Sextus Empiricus Math. 7.227–241, 372-ff, 424
• Aët. Plac. 4.8.1, 4.9.4, 4.21.1–4;, 4.23.1
• Ps-Plutarch Plac. IV.12.1, 15.3
• Philodemus, Mus. cols. 34, 115;
• Galenus Hipp. Off. Med. (XVIIIB.629–925 K.) 1.3, XVIIIB.654 K.
• Hierocles, St. Eth. 6. 1–6
• Calcidius ch. 220 (p. 233 Waszink).

Contact:

• Mary Immaculate College
• Daniel.Vazquez[at]mic.ul.ie

Abstract:

I set out to examine the metaphysical side of Alexander’s treatment of the unity of perception in De Anima 60.19–65.2 and Quaestiones III 9. While Alexander follows closely Aristotle’s argument for there being a numerically identical but in some way divisible subject which perceives opposite qualities as well as the difference of perceptibles different in kind, he goes beyond Aristotle’s discussion in that he pays explicit attention to the metaphysical dimensions of sense-perception in this particular context. Aristotle accounts for the indivisibility and divisibility of the faculty in question in terms of an obscure geometrical analogy. Alexander spells out this analogy in greater detail, and argues that it is meant to convey the incorporeality of the faculty of perception. He also carefully distinguishes the respective roles of the sense-organ and the perceptual faculty; in doing so, he avails himself of the distinction between the affection and the judgement, which is also used by the Stoics. I address the questions of how Alexander’s account fits into his general metaphysics of the soul and what is involved in the incorporeality he attributes to the perceptual faculty, contrasting Alexanders’s conception with the Platonic (Plotinian) notion of the incorporeality of the soul.

Main texts:

• Alexander of Aphrodisias De Anima 60.19–65.2 
• Alexander of Aphrodisias Quaestiones III.9

Contact:

• Eötvös Loránd University, Institute of Philosophy, Budapest
•  bene.laszlo[at]btk.elte.hu

Abstract:

TBA

Main texts:

TBA

Contact:

• Research Centre for the Humanities, Moravcsik Gyula Institute
•  guba.agoston[at]abtk.hu

Abstract:

In this paper, I scrutinise how the late Neoplatonist commentators Ps-Philoponus and Ps-Simplicius interpreted the latter part of Aristotle’s De Anima III.2 (426b8–427a16). In this passage, Aristotle discusses how we can distinguish the perceptible objects of different senses, like white and sweet. The question in itself does not sound like a crucial philosophical problem. However, it arguably concerns no less than the unity of perceptual consciousness. It also relates to issues like how we perceive complex (i.e. physical) bodies as a single body or perceptual awareness, i.e. the awareness of our own perceptions. Whether these problems are at stake, how Aristotle solves them, or how this later passage relates to the earlier parts of chapter De Anima III.2 is far from obvious. Consequently, it is no surprise that the passage has become of much interest to both ancient and modern commentators.

    Thus, it is crucial to see what problem each commentator identifies in the passages, how they reconstruct the line of thought and the arguments, and what position they arrive at concerning the issue. Moreover, while Aristotle discusses the related problem of simultaneous perception of several perceptibles in De Sensu 7, our Neoplatonist commentators do not seem to appeal to these discussions directly. Instead, they seem to use Alexander of Aphrodisias’ comments. This point leads to further discussion of the possible influence of previous interpretations of Aristotle on our commentators.  Considering all these aspects of the two commentaries on De Anima III.2, 426b8–427a16 can thus shed some light not only on the peculiar solutions to the problem of the unity of perceptual consciousness but on the working method of these commentators.

    I argue that Ps-Philoponus largely follows Alexander and provides a Platonised Peripatetic solution appealing to a faculty of common sense. In contrast, Ps-Simplicius seems not to be impressed by Alexander’s account, departing from it in detail and at crucial points while holding a standard Neoplatonist position, according to which the rational soul is responsible for any higher perceptual function.

Main texts:

• Ps-Philoponus, in De Anima 477.20–485.6
• Ps-Philoponus, in De Anima 455.12–456.11
• Ps-Simplicius, in De Anima 195.28–201.30

Contact:

• Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of Philosophy